Banca de DEFESA: LEONARDO GILL CORREIA SANTOS

Uma banca de DEFESA de DOUTORADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
DISCENTE: LEONARDO GILL CORREIA SANTOS
DATA : 21/08/2023
HORA: 13:30
LOCAL: Virtual
TÍTULO:

You Said You'D Never Compromise: The Winner-Loser Gap and Perceptions of System Responsiveness in Parliamentary Systems

PALAVRAS-CHAVES:

External Efficacy; Electoral Behavior; Winner-Loser Gap; Coalition Governments; Parliamentary Systems

PÁGINAS: 30
RESUMO:

Does voting for a junior cabinet party influence voters’ perception of system responsiveness? Existent literature on electoral behavior suggests that voters of parties in government perceive higher levels of system responsiveness (external efficacy) compared to voters of opposition parties. This winner-loser gap tends to narrow in coalition governments, which is associated with winners’ negative views of party compromise within coalition governments. However, it is unclear if these dynamics apply to all voters of the winning majority. This study fills this gap by analyzing the influence of the electoral behavior of winning voters on the perception of system responsiveness. I argue that winners’ external efficacy is affected by the perception of how compromising the party they voted for is with the winning coalition. Formateur parties’ voters, which appoint the prime minister, are expected to have higher levels of perceived responsiveness compared to voters of junior cabinet parties. Furthermore, the perceived responsiveness is also expected to be influenced by the relative size of junior cabinet parties within the coalition, with voters of medium-sized parties exhibiting lower increases in external efficacy as compared to voters of smaller parties. To test these hypotheses, I employ two research designs. First, I conduct a cross-national analysis using survey data of the CSES dataset. This analysis covers 14 election studies in 7 countries with coalition governments, resulting in 23,657 individual observations. To test the hypotheses, I use multilevel logistic regressions combined with a pre-post design, wherein I compare voters before and after cabinet announcements. The findings show that voters of junior cabinet parties feel less efficacious than voters of formateur parties before cabinet announcements, but their perception increases after the government makeup is made public. The effect is driven by the reaction of smaller cabinet-party voters. Voters of medium-sized cabinet parties are less influenced by cabinet announcements. Secondly, the argument is further explored through a case-study of the coalition formation process after the 2017 Bundestag Elections in Germany, which witnessed the announcement of two different coalitions: a failed Jamaica Coalition (CDU-CSU, FDP, and Greens) in October and a successful Grand Coalition (CDU-CSU and SPD) in January. The GESIS survey panel dataset is employed for a detailed analysis during the coalition talks period using weighted logistic regressions and panel regression, and an event history model using difference-in-differences design, comparing formateur parties’ voters to voters of the two different coalitions after their respective coalition announcements. The findings indicate that SPD voters’ perception of responsiveness increased when the party announced they were joining the opposition, but decreased when the party joined the government. However, no significant variation was observed for voters of FDP and Greens, who exhibited relatively stable levels of external efficacy during the period. This research sheds light on unexplored aspects of how electoral behavior influences citizens’ attitudes. Moreover, as the sheer number of coalition governments continues to escalate, understanding how people perceive them becomes increasingly important in the research agenda on the field of comparative politics.

MEMBROS DA BANCA:
Externo à Instituição - CARLOS EDUARDO FERREIRA PEREIRA FILHO - FGV
Externo à Instituição - GEORGE AVELINO FILHO - FGV
Presidente - 1131088 - MARCUS ANDRE BARRETO CAMPELO DE MELO
Interna - 1339568 - NARA DE CARVALHO PAVAO
Interno - 1145313 - RICARDO BORGES GAMA NETO