Family Ties: How Political Family Relations Shape Federal Transfers in Brazil
Political Dynasties ,Voluntary Transfers, Informal institutions, Subnational politics, Fiscal federalism
What is the effect of political dynasties on federal transfers to municipalities? In Brazil, most public resources are concentrated at the federal level, and ministries exercise considerable discretion in allocating funds to municipalities through voluntary transfers. This research investigates whether mayors belonging to political families, that is, those with relatives who have held elected office, secure more federal resources than mayors without such ties.
The central hypothesis is that dynastic mayors obtain more federal funding through voluntary transfers because they benefit from political capital that broadens their access to the federal state apparatus, whether through prior knowledge of bureaucratic rules or through political networks that facilitate resource acquisition. In particular, mayors with relatives in the federal legislature are expected to secure larger amounts, given their proximity to actors who shape the distribution of federal funds.
To identify political families, we employ a novel data-collection strategy that uses OCR-based web scraping to extract background certificates from the TSE Candidacy System. Using the family declarations from the 2020 elections, we trace kinship ties to candidacies from 1994 to 2024. We combine this dataset with information on federal voluntary transfers from 2021 to 2023 and estimate the effects of political lineage using linear regressions with year fixed effects. Results suggest that, although the effect is not universal, dynastic mayors obtain fewer resources on average than their non-dynastic counterparts within municipalities.