Banca de QUALIFICAÇÃO: LUCAS VIANA DA SILVA

Uma banca de QUALIFICAÇÃO de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
DISCENTE: LUCAS VIANA DA SILVA
DATA : 31/08/2026
LOCAL: virtual
TÍTULO:

THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF MINIMUM WAGES ON LABOR
ALLOCATION AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: EVIDENCE FROM
BRAZIL

 

PALAVRAS-CHAVES:

Minimum Wage; Social Protection; Benefit Indexation; Formal
Employment; Difference-in-Differences.

 

PÁGINAS: 16
RESUMO:

Can the design of social protection built on the minimum wage undermine the
formal employment it presupposes? In Brazil, real growth of the federal
minimum wage mechanically raises the value of several social benefits, such
as the BPC and the Unemployment Insurance floor, while formal employment
is precisely what makes income observable for benefit eligibility screening.
This project tests whether the resulting gap between formal wages and indexed
benefits shapes workers' attachment to formal employment in occupations near
the wage floor, and whether this social-insurance channel is offset or
reinforced by conventional labor demand responses to higher wage costs.
Identification exploits the staggered adoption of state wage floors, which raise
formal wages above the federal minimum for statutorily eligible occupations
only, mechanically widening the wage-benefit gap where they bind, a source
of variation that lets the two channels be separated empirically. Combining a
novel occupation-level database of state wage floor legislation with an
occupation-level minimum wage bite measure built from pre-treatment RAIS
wage distributions, the project applies staggered difference-in-differences
methods to linked administrative employment and social benefit records to
estimate these effects, filling a gap in the literature that has yet to link wage
floor variation to take-up of minimum-wage-indexed benefits.

 

MEMBROS DA BANCA:
Interno - 3384435 - FRANCISCO DE LIMA CAVALCANTI
Interno - 1769063 - MARCELO EDUARDO ALVES DA SILVA
Presidente - 2777451 - RAFAEL DA SILVA VASCONCELOS