Does Tax Authority Monitoring Affect Workers’
Payment in Large Corporations?
Tax enforcement, tax monitoring, wages, employment, regression
discontinuity
This paper estimates the labor market spillover effects of tax enforcement
on large corporations. Exploiting the unpredictable and lagged eligibility
thresholds of an exclusive continuous monitoring program targeting Brazil’s
largest taxpayers, I use a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify
the causal impact of tax scrutiny on wages and employment. Using matched
employer-employee data for publicly traded firms between 2012 and 2017, I
find that continuous monitoring reduces average monthly wages by approx-
imately 22 percent. This wage penalty is disproportionately larger for male
workers (28–32 percent) compared to female workers (24 percent), with ad-
justments occurring rapidly under stricter monitoring regimes. However, I
find no statistically significant effects on the total employment stock. These
findings suggest that when faced with strict tax enforcement, large firms absorb
the compliance costs by restructuring workers’ compensation—likely through
variable pay—rather than adjusting their headcount.